Portfolio pt. 2 - Analysing Ukrainian Democracy

Analyse the assumption that the Russian invasion of Ukraine might have been prevented if the latter had become a strong democracy earlier.

This Essay aims to analyse the initial invasion of Ukrainian territory, coming through the 2014 annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014. There are two key actors that played a role within this invasion; the weakness of the Ukrainian democracy at the time, and the Russian goals, challenging Ukrainian sovereignty. The goals of this essay therefore are to first analyse the underlying weakness of Ukrainian democracy, before looking at how these issues contributed to the rise of Yanukovych and subsequent Euromaidan protests. This will underpin the view that despite the weaknesses of Ukraine's democracy causing issues in the build-up to the invasion, it was in fact Russian challenges and Putin’s goals that were the main factor leading to the start of the Russo-Ukrainian war and the build-up to the full scale invasion in 2022.

Firstly, it is important to outline the framework on which a strong democracy will be measured, coming from Morlino, “a quality or good democracy to be one presenting a stable institutional structure that realizes the liberty and equality of citizens through the legitimate and correct functioning of its institutions and mechanisms” (2002, p. 4). Within the context of Ukraine, their democracy became limited after the fall of the soviet union, with a weak national identity being built by “Members of Ukraine’s “transfer class””, causing weak compromises in government (Kushnir et al, 2021, p. 142). Leaving them with “limited opportunities to develop national identities and political institutions” (Kushnir et al, 2021, p. 135). Highlighting an unstable institutional structure, with the Ukrainian public describing their political system as a “madhouse” in the 2000’s where these weak compromises lead to clashes between the PM and president, showing poor functioning of systems (Motyl, 2010, p.125). This combined with issues of looming “Russian interest” (Kushnir et al, 2021, p. 137) lead to a weakened democracy, which when taken advantage of by Yanukovych would play a big part in the factors behind the Russian invasion. On top of this, Russian interests in Ukrainian democracy caused issues from the start, preventing it from becoming a truly stable democracy, setting up the 2014 annexation (Kuzio, 2010).

The main event which shows the interplay between the exposed weakness of Ukrainian democracy and Russian meddling, leading to the 2014 annexation, was the Euromaidan crisis. The precursor to this, Yanukovych’s election, shows democratic failings within Ukraine. Despite winning with just ⅓ of the electorate, he immediately made moves which undermined democracy, changing constitutional rules, as well as going against the public's wishes and strengthening ties with Russia (Motyl, 2010, p.126). Causing issues that would in the longer term lead to the Euromaidan protests due to his hiding of movements to seal a trade deal with Russia rather than joining the EU (Khoma, 2020). Subsequent protests would prove to be one of several possible factors for Russian action in Crimea, with the democratic deficit caused by the ousting of Yanukovych allowing an opportunity for Russian action (Treisman, 2016), highlighting how the weakness in the systems of Ukrainian democracy directly contributed to the invasion.

However, to blame this invasion completely on Ukrainian democratic failings is limited The Euromaidan protests also highlighted the Russian contribution in preventing the strengthening of democracy, and their expansionist goals. Putin’s rhetoric around this time aimed to “legitimize the operation and deny Ukraine’s right to exist as a sovereign state” (Erdinger, 2023, p. 749), showing that regardless of their democratic strength, Russia wouldn't recognise Ukraine. Mearsheimer also highlights that Russia’s decision to act was likely caused by western influence in Ukraine, with attempts to turn it into a NATO stronghold leaving Russia with little choice not to act (2014). Putin’s decision to Annex Crimea and invade in 2022 largely stemmed from a belief that Ukraine was not a legitimate state as well as fear of further NATO enlargement, rather than just Ukraines democratic failings.

Russia’s role in starting the Euromaidan protests also exposes their exploitation and promotion of weakened Ukrainian democracy in order to invade. Russia used “market power to put pressure on governments in Ukraine” (Erdinger, 2023, p. 754), contributing to the U-turn away from the EU that caused the protests, as well as playing a background role in pro-Russian Yanukovych getting elected in the first place (Kuzio, 2010). Showing that while Ukraine’s weakened democracy played a role in this regard, it was Russia pushing it to weaken, through their influence in elections and denial of sovereignty, giving them greater justification to invade.

To conclude, it can be seen that despite Ukraine being a weak democracy when looked at through this particular framework, there are multiple factors that caused the invasion, therefore meaning it is unlikely that strengthening their democracy would have proved effective in preventing it, and Russian influence made strengthening the democracy largely impossible. Democratic weakness made the 2014 annexation and latter invasion easier, however it was Russia’s overarching expansionism and defence against NATO that were the driving factors behind the invasion.

Word Count: 822

Bibliography

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Kushnir, O., Mahda, Y., Pankieiev, O., Bennich-Björkman, L., Chojan, A., Domaradski, S., Giusti, S., Kavalski, E. E., Khvostova, M., & Lash, C. (2021). Meandering in transition: Thirty years of reforms and identity in post-communist Europe. Lexington Books/Fortress Academic.https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/portsmouth-ebooks/reader.action?docID=6689340&ppg=153

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Kuzio, T. (2010, January 14). The Russian Factor in Ukraine’s 2010 Presidential Elections. The Jamestown Foundation. https://jamestown.org/program/the-russian-factor-in-ukraines-2010-presidential-elections/

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Morlino, L. (2002, October-November 31-2). What is a “Good” Democracy? Theory and Empirical Analysis. [Paper presentation]. “The European Union, Nations State, and the Quality of Democracy. Lessons from Southern Europe, Berkeley, California, USA. https://d1wqtxts1xzle7.cloudfront.net/31032653/cp02-what_is_good_democracy-libre.pdf?1392143483=&response-content-disposition=inline%3B+filename%3DWhat_is_a_Good_Democracy_Theory_and_Empi.pdf&Expires=1736038446&Signature=hE6nTEkENbQgdYjjZI8RFyuuvAyi66hGl5TFObUj6bABy2X5tTwnGkSgJRkajV7qvL46av2hkRgN9AT5W1kNIOF0azKPZAflplmCWCfApXlHc4yihds0bsmz8jyu8LYwBqDkND6JU-xMMJhE4D9og5hMT~oFxcV-2UGPG6q2TXGMC~DCYpLOmoHDOBiXOcUwM6ZLK5INqRa4I7GCZDftY9W-B1lYDOPJp~kFRepUs5Wql70N15~ZDyLqcfBeJ6bvxL2O1TKsvFJRz2XBY0nHxKQue2u1YturYAUV1Go4iqrjjPzJpgez-EEmAmffunDhxW8FlnaacvHeRyKGm-SYzA__&Key-Pair-Id=APKAJLOHF5GGSLRBV4ZA

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Treisman, D. (2016). Why Putin took Crimea: The gambler in the Kremlin. Foreign Affairs, 95(3), 47–54. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2016-04-18/why-russian-president-putin-took-crimea-from-ukraine?utm_source=chatgpt.com