Why have British political leaders found it so difficult to decide on Britain's relationship with Europe?

This Essay explores common difficulties faced by five key figures across the period between the European projects’ 1940’s inception, through to the 2016 leave referendum. This will be divided into four key periods: Churchill and Bevin in the 1940s, Heath in the 1970s, Thatcher from 1979-1990, and Cameron in the lead-up to the 2016 Brexit vote. There are two key elements faced by all five of these figures that dictated their decisions regarding the UK’s relationship with Europe. “The first is British exceptionalism, the self-perception … of the UK as a unique, special nation”, “Second is Euroscepticism … reservations about the supposed benefits of increased political cooperation between EU member states” (Islentyeva & Dunkel, 2022, p. 1). These combined with the Churchillian values that underpinned the “conservative nature of British foreign policy discourse” (Broad & Daddow, 2010) to create a feeling that throughout their respective time periods, all five leaders were split on the type of relationship Britain wanted to have with European institutions, as well as having to navigate parliamentary pushback, limiting their ability to affect the relationship. Therefore, despite differing circumstances and levels of European integration faced by these leaders, similar sentiments remained. Overall making European relations difficult.

Firstly, Winston Churchill's views in the 1940s are indispensable in understanding the challenges UK leaders faced regarding Europe. His idealism and beliefs outlined a vision for all UK leaders handling UK-European integration, with his differing tones towards European integration playing a role in the confusion over how much we wanted going forward. On one hand, he pushed for closer European integration in speeches such as the University of Zurich speech, where he talked of a need to build a “United States of Europe” (Churchill, 1946, para. 3) to champion post-war European recovery, envisioning the UK as having a role to play within a combined Europe. To him, a homogenised Europe offered “individuals a sense of enlarged patriotism” (Churchill, 1946, para. 5). Although on the other hand, he undermined this, driving exceptionalism through the “construction of this mythical British self in contrast to a European other” (Islentyeva & Dunkel, 2022, p. 2), a sentiment that would remain and prove to be a long term factor in leader’s splits over the type of relationship they would like with Europe. Churchill’s conflicts as a leader on Britain's relationship with Europe came from this exceptionalist sentiment, one brewed through the UK’s perceived “special relationship” (U.S. Embassy & Consulates, n.d.) with the USA, as well as the Commonwealth. The Euroscepticism that churchill showed stemmed from fears that closer ties with Europe would damage these relations, and can be seen in his 1946 speech in holland, “It is evident of course that the affairs of Great Britain and the British Commonwealth and Empire, are becoming ever more closely interwoven with those of the United States” (Churchill, 1946). The lack of a mention of Europe showed where his priorities lied. He saw closer ties with these two bodies as more important, fearing limitations coming from Europe, showing an early example of splits over the kind of relationship leaders wanted. Overall, Churchill’s vision proved largely important going forward, with his idealist vision for a Britain that was both a part of Europe but also separate, generating splits in policy discourse, having a large influence on the parliament that Attlee faced, as well as his ideals playing a key role in Thatchers vision. This vision can therefore be seen as setting in motion leaders' splits over the kind of relationship they would like with Europe, as his “with Europe but not of it” ideals (Islentyeva & Dunkel, 2022, p. 6) would underpin much of British foreign policy discourse.

The second individual that highlighted the difficulty of navigating Britain's relationship with Europe in the 1940’s was Ernest Bevin, foreign secretary to Attlee (1945-1951). Just as with Churchill’s period in office, despite talks of a need for closer European ties, none materialised. Bevin shared Churchills exceptionalist sense of supporting Europe while limiting Britain's involvement, as Young highlighted “On the one hand he conveys a sense of European unity mattering intensely to him. On the other hand he seems to regard the concept of Europe as forever hostile to the British interest” (1999, p. 27), with this ideal of Europe as hostile to the British interest once again highlighting the key theme of exceptionalism. At the same time, Bevin also faced the issue of Euroscepticism within parliament, with the foreign office ruling out Britain joining a supra-national organisation in 1948 due to the fact it simply would not have gone through parliament (Young, 1999, p. 36), a key sign, as parliamentary Euroscepticism would prove a key factor in leaders decisions on Europe across the whole period (1940-2016). Bevin largely suffered from two key values highlighted by Fontana & Parsons, the exceptionalist value of “British as distinctively global, not European”, as well as “parliamentary sovereignty that rejected federal or shared power” (Fontana et al, 2014), both of which limiting his autonomy to act. Ultimately highlighting the full combination of factors limiting leaders in terms of decision making on Britain's relationship with Europe in the 1940’s under Churchill and Bevin, where both leaders were faced with a mix of personal reservations built from British exceptionalism, as well as challenges from a Eurosceptic parliament, largely limiting their ability to effectively decide on a relationship with Europe.

Thirdly, moving onto the 1970’s, under Heath the circumstances of the relationship with Europe had changed, with Britain joining the EEC in 1973. Despite this, Heath still had to contend with a heavily split and Eurosceptic parliament just as Attlee before him, on the day of the vote to join, 39 Conservatives voted against entry and 69 Labour MPs in favour, both going against their respective parties (Boyd & Aitken, 1971). This shows that even when we have pushed for closer ties with Europe, the Eurosceptic movement has always remained an ever present within Britain, possibly stemming from a lack of “a passionate pro-European faction in British politics” (Copeland et al, 2017), something that would lead to the referendums under Wilson and Cameron, as well as splits causing issues for Attlee and Thatcher highlighting how the Eurosceptic movement played a key role in influencing British leader’s standing on Europe.

The issues of confusion over what Heath actually believed Britain was joining in 1973 also showed that there was still no clear vision on what kind of relationship Heath wanted Britain to have with Europe, a recurring issue. There was “ambivalence at the time of the UK’s accession in 1973, as to whether it was merely joining a free-trading association, or signing up to a programme of ever closer political and economic union.” (Simms, 2015.). Once again highlighting issues of indecision over the type of relationship leaders wanted with Europe, prompting tensions that would eventually lead to the 1975 referendum under Wilson (Bush, 2016). This referendum, as with the one in 2016 exposed one of the key difficulties of leaders when dealing with Europe, the issue that Euroscepticism split both parties within parliament, meaning leaders had to walk a fine line. Individuals who “could hardly be more unalike in their personalities” (Swain, 2018, p. 948) would both be supporting their respective sides in the European debate, so Wilson was largely pushed to make this decision to hold a referendum, similarly to Cameron, in the hopes that “the way to resolve deep divisions in society was to force people to come to a binary decision” (Stewart, 2023, p. 178). The Heath period, leading into the Wilson referendum once again shows many of the same issues faced by all British leaders on Europe. Issues of navigating a largely Eurosceptic party and parliament, combined with a personal worry of what kind of relationship the UK would be agreeing to with Europe, stemming from the aforementioned “conservative nature of British foreign policy discourse” (Broad & Daddow, 2010) fueled by exceptionalism set out by Churchill.

The fourth aspect, the Thatcher years throughout the 1980’s, displayed something of a duality in tone towards Europe, similarly to the period under Churchill. On the one hand, exceptionalism and Euroscepticism became the truly dominant force in British political discourse, but on the other, as a nation we moved closer to European integration with the signing of the SEA, giving closer political ties with Europe and teeing up the creation of the EU (European Parliament, 1986). While Thatcher herself was largely Eurosceptic, Fontana highlights, “On Europe ... she did not challenge Heath's ‘party of Europe’ legacy for a long time” largely due to the restraint from parliament and the public she had after Wilson’s referendum ended the European question (Fontana et al, 2014). Highlighting another example of parliamentary decisions limiting a leader's freedom in regards to Europe, a similar issue faced by Bevin, Heath and later Cameron. These internal party splits could be seen through her EEC budget rebate, which “appalled her European interlocutors and many of her Conservative colleagues” (Fontana et al, 2014), showing how her Eurosceptic decision making on Europe, pushing British exceptionalism, due to her own neoliberal tendencies and fear of dominance from Brussels (Islentyeva & Dunkel, 2022, p. 6) would at times clash with her own party, somewhat limiting her ability to act.

Thatcher, following the trend alongside all the other leaders, also had splits over the type of relationship she wanted with Europe. Her 1988 Bruges speech proves a good example as to the duality in tone: “We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level ... Certainly we want to see Europe more united and with a greater sense of common purpose.” (Thatcher, 1988). Similarly to Churchill, on the one hand she pushed back at European governance, while at the same time she still wanted to see a united Europe containing Britain, with “The ‘creation of a genuinely common market’ having been an aim expressed repeatedly during Thatcher’s leadership” (Smedley, 2021).

Once again highlighting the difficulties British leaders faced in regards to Europe, Thatcher shared personal feelings of exceptionalism and Euroscepticism, while also being split over what type of relationship she wanted with Europe and facing parliamentary limitations on her ability to act. Despite this, it can be argued “Margaret Thatcher personally set Britain on a far more anti-European path than it was otherwise likely to take” (Fontana et al, 2014), with the aforementioned Bruges speech leading to a huge rise in internal party Euroscepticism through the creation of the Bruges group (Helm, 2013), eventually pushing Cameron to act. This period echoes sentiments of the 1940’s, with Thatcher sharing tones of Churchill’s European values, while being limited by parliament, similarly to attlee, after the referendum under Wilson.

The final leader and time period in this analysis comes from the issues Cameron had with his decision making on Europe in the 2010’s, eventually culminating in the referendum in 2016. By this time, the Eurosceptic movement had largely reached its peak, with the pro-independence UKIP obtaining 12.6% of the votes in 2015 (BBC, 2015), pushing British Exceptionalism offering economic benefits from a “more radical market ideology unfettered by EU rules” (Glencross, 2015, p.555). “Cameron chose to commit to a vote, not because the country’s population was clamouring for one but because a significant minority of his own MPs, many of them frustrated by the constraints of coalition, were demanding that he do so” (Bale, 2022). Once again showing an example of a leader's decision making influenced by a Eurosceptic parliament. Cameron also shared the sentiment of being unsure over what type of relationship he wanted with Europe, with his aim of a “British” and “flexible” Europe that would restore its global competitiveness by allowing powers to “flow back” from the centre” (Glencross, 2015, p.555) echoing Churchills “with Europe but not of it” ideals (Islentyeva & Dunkel, 2022, p. 6). Highlighting that Cameron was faced with many of the same issues outlined, facing a Eurosceptic movement that pushed him to call a referendum just as Wilson, while also having reservations about the relationship and level of integration he wanted Britain to have with Europe.

To conclude, it can be seen that much of the difficulty pertaining to British leaders' relationships with Europe and decisions made, stems from the “conservative nature of British foreign policy discourse” (Broad & Daddow, 2010). This caused a sentiment that throughout this entire time period left leaders unsure of the type of relationship they wanted with Europe, echoing exceptionalist ideals. This was then coupled with parliamentary pushback on change, whether through Eurosceptic movements under Attlee, Heath and Cameron, or a pro-European consensus under Thatcher, limiting abilities to decide on Britain’s relationship with Europe. Much of this stems from initial ideals set out in the 1940’s by Churchill, with indecision over relations echoing his “with Europe but not of it” ideals (Islentyeva & Dunkel, 2022, p. 6) fueling both exceptionalism and Eurosceptic movements. On a deeper level, these common issues are most clearly seen when comparing the 1975 and 2016 referendum factors, as well as the approaches to European integration taken by Thatcher and Churchill, showing how these common issues have transcended time periods, with Eurosceptiscim and Exceptionalism driving indecision in leaders decisions relating to Europe.

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